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Abstract: The geography of knowledge flows has shown that the probability of a patent 
applicant rather than the examiner originating a citation depends on differences between 
citing and cited countries. How the characteristics of the citing country affect that 
probability has received less attention. Using European Patent Office (EPO) data of over 
3,500,000 citations (1997-2007), we find that the probability of applicant citation is 
higher as national economic and scientific strengths increase, if applicants and examiners 
come from the same country and if the country belongs to EPO. This ‘country club’ 
effect is comparable to that found for US Patent and Trademark Office. 
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1 Introduction	
The geography of innovation makes extensive use of backward citations in patents to 
measure knowledge flows (Jaffe et al., 1993). Several works emphasize the importance 
of distinguishing the origins of citations because, in theory, citations inserted by patent 
                                                 
1 The research was carried out with funding from project GV/2012/018 of the Valencian Regional 
Government. A previous version of the paper was presented at the T2S 2013 Conference. Carlos Benito 
and África Villanueva helped with brainstorming. Davide Consoli participated in a related paper that 
inspired this one. Jordi Molas-Gallart revised a previous version. Ester Planells offered technical 
assistance. Davide Lingua clarified issues related to the information in Patstat. 
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examiners are likely to be less localized than applicant citations. United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) data mostly tend to confirm this for the US case (Thompson, 
2006) although there are some differences for some specific measures of distance 
(Alcácer & Gittelman, 2006). European data confirm it for some European countries 
(Criscuolo & Verspagen, 2008), but not some regions with low absorptive capacity 
(Azagra-Caro et al., 2009). These studies focus on the match or distance between citing 
and cited country. However there is another geographic concern that has been largely 
unexplored, i.e. what are the characteristics of the citing country? Do patent examiners 
add more citations to patent applications from specific countries? 
This is a relevant question because the answer might reveal underlying economic forces 
that are subject to policy influence, or uncover individual questionable examiner 
practices. There is some evidence suggesting that, for the USPTO, geographic origin of 
the applicant matters, e.g. US examiners add more citations to foreign applications 
(Alcácer et al., 2009).2 However, there is a lack of research on a similar ‘club effect’ in 
the case of the European Patent Office (EPO). This is unfortunate because the EPO is 
frequently used as a benchmark against the USPTO, and is considered one of the highest 
quality patent systems due to its rigorous granting process and flexibility applied to later 
stages in a patent’s life (Saint-George & van Pottelsberghe, 2013). This paper focuses on 
the EPO. By comparing with the USPTO, we should be able to identify whether there is a 
symmetrical geographical effect, namely whether EPO patent examiners are more likely 
to add citations to foreign applications. 
This implies a need first to define ‘foreign’ in the context of the EPO. The question of 
national differences in patent examiner versus patent applicant inserted citations is 
                                                 
2 Even within a European NUTS2 region, NUTS3 regional per capita income is negatively associated with 
(Spanish) national examiner citations and positively associated with inventor citations (Azagra-Caro et al., 
2011). 
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especially interesting in the case of the EPO because it is an international patent office. In 
national patent offices, applicants seek protection in one country only, which may or may 
not be their own, so examiners can clearly differentiate between domestic and foreign 
applicants. In the EPO, the distinction between domestic and foreign applicants is 
blurred, since grants provide protection for inventions in many countries, and examiners 
can include people of different nationalities. National patent offices may judge foreign 
applicants according to criteria that are not the same as those of the applicant’s country’s 
patent office whereas the EPO applies international criteria, agreed upon by the signatory 
countries to the European Patent Convention, i.e. members of the European Patent 
Organization (EPOrg), to judge applications from different countries. Therefore, our 
research questions are: Do EPO examiners add extra citations to applications from 
countries outside the EPOrg? And do EPO examiners add extra citations to applications 
from countries other than their own? 
In an analysis of over 3,500,000 backward citations in years 1990-2007 drawn from EPO 
data, we found substantial differences in the share of examiner citations across applicant 
countries (Source: Patstat, edition October 2012). In our view, these variations deserve 
explanation. 
To do this, we isolate the influence of many sub-national variables, i.e. characteristics of 
citations, patents and applicants. We already know that differences in the citation shares 
of applicants and examiners vary according to type of patent and type of applicant 
(Alcácer et al., 2009; Azagra-Caro et al., 2011). This paper contributes to fine-grained 
analysis of the phases of the patenting process and types of citations. This should 
increase our understanding of the effect of origin of citations in the EPO. Are they 
associated with granted patents (which seems not to be the case in the USPTO)? Are they 
associated with the scientific knowledge base of the patent? 
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To put this research in context, we discuss some of these sub-national aspects in detail to 
understand citation processes at the EPO (section 2). We present the data (section 3) and 
the results (section 4), and finally we conclude (section 5). 
2 Citation	processes	in	the	EPO	
2.1 Identifying	 the	 distinction	 between	 applicant	 and	 inventor	
citations	at	the	EPO	
Information on differences between applicant and examiner citations in EPO applications 
is provided in the search report (Criscuolo & Verspagen, 2008). Examiners produce 
search reports and include citations to previous art. They divide citations into 
‘categories’. The categorization is specific to the search report formats of the EPO, PCT, 
and many other authorities.3 The patent examiner decides which citations in the 
application text are relevant to the examination and therefore should be included in the 
search report (category D). The examiner also adds (usually a majority of) citations, in 
several categories (X, Y, A, etc.). Table 1 provides figures for the distribution in the 
sample studied here. 
{Table 1 around here} 
The biggest block of citations refers to the state-of-the-art without challenging the 
patentability of the invention (category A). The second biggest block (based on number 
of citations) indicates possible challenges to patentability, and so is qualitatively more 
important because it reduces the probability of a patent being granted (categories X and 
Y). The third biggest block is citations included by the applicant (category D). 
                                                 
3 However, not all authorities use this format (the US does not unless it is a PCT search report, then the 
USPTO has to provide the data required by the PCT), so they do not provide the categories. Moreover, if 
citations are added by examiners (or in the opposition procedure) following the search report, these are not 
categorized. 
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Some studies explain the meaning of these categories X, Y and A in more detail (e.g. 
Meyer, 2000). For the purposes of the present study, what matters is the share of category 
D citations over total citations which is used as a proxy for the share of applicant 
citations (Criscuolo & Verspagen, 2008). 
2.2 EPO	procedures	and	search	reports	
Criscuolo & Verspagen (2008) analyze citations from the search report. They do not 
provide details on which search report and there are three types of documents that are 
referred to as search reports: EPO search reports, examination reports, and international 
search reports. A precise understanding of citation phases could help clarify this issue. 
Figure 1 represents the process. 
{Figure 1 around here} 
Citations originate in several phases of the patent’s life. Not all patent offices require 
completion of all phases.4 Not every phase generates applicant and examiner citations 
simultaneously. For direct EPO applications, there are two relevant phases. First, the 
EPO search procedure which ends with publication of an EPO search report. The main 
purpose of the search report is to document whether the application fulfills the 
requirements of novelty and non-obviousness. It is not binding but it signals to the 
applicant the likelihood of the patent being granted, which informs the decision about 
whether to pay the extra fees required to continue the process. 
The second phase consists of the substantive examination. Examiners assess industry 
applications in addition to novelty and non-obviousness. This phase ends with the 
publication of an examination report and grant or denial of the patent. 
                                                 
4 An overview can be found in file REFI Statistics 2014.xlsx, open to the public in: 
http://documents.epo.org/projects/babylon/rawdata.nsf/0/a655ef0be2534bdbc1257991002894cf?OpenDocu
ment [2/4/2014]. 
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The EPO allows indirect applications through the PCT procedure. The PCT authorizes 
some patent offices to be International Search Authorities and run a unified application 
protocol, valid in all signatory countries. In this case, there is a phase that produces 
applicant and examiner citations which precedes the first two phases described above, 
and results in an international search report published by the PCT. After publication of 
the international search report, if the applicant designates the EPO as ‘region’ of 
protection, the application enters the ‘European regional phase’ and becomes a Euro-PCT 
application, which then enters the two phases described above. 
3 Model,	data	and	variables	
We estimate the following model: 
 Pr( ) ( , , , )ijklt it jt kt lt ijkltappcit f X X X X       (1) 
where appcit is equal to 1 if the citation is inserted by the applicant and 0 if inserted by 
the examiner. The probability varies according to the characteristics of the citation i, the 
patent j, the applicant k and the applicant country l. The year of the patent application t, is 
lagged two periods for national economic and research and development (R&D) 
characteristics to prevent endogeneity. 
Data on patents and citations come from Patstat (October 2012 edition). Figure 2 
provides a visualization of the process. We selected patents where the publication 
authority was the EPO –almost 2.5 million. After removing those with missing or 
unreliable information for application year5 and technology class (represented by the 
                                                 
5 We excluded the period after 2008 because Patstat does not include citation categories after that year. We 
also excluded 2008 given the decrease in the number of applications which is probably due to statistical not 
real reasons (delay induced by the grant process). 
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International Patent Classification IPC), and those without citations,6 we were left with 2 
million patents. 
{Figure 2 around here} 
Those patents contained over 12 million citations (Figure 3). Patstat classifies them into 
origin types, i.e. the moment in the examination process when the citation was inserted. 
There are ten types of origins (coded 0-9), but only some are relevant for this study, i.e. 
those indicating that either patent applicant or examiner could have inserted the citation 
(see section 2.2 for further details): origins coded 0 (citations introduced during search), 
2 (citations introduced during examination) and 5 (citations from the International Search 
Report). They represent most (82%) of the citations. 
Patstat differentiates who inserted the citation by classifying citations with origins 0, 2 
and 5 into several categories. Categories (coded with single letters, A, X, Y, etc.), refer to 
the relevance of prior art to invalidate claims of novelty. Criscuolo & Verspagen (2008) 
call category D ‘applicant citations’ and sum the other categories as ‘examiner citations’. 
We follow this method (see section 2.1 for further details). 
{Figure 3 around here} 
In the estimations, the number of observations is not the number of citations for two 
reasons (Figure 4). First, duplicates are created if the patent has more than one applicant. 
We deal with this econometrically by weighting the observations by the inverse number 
of applicants. Second, we match Patstat to other databases on national characteristics that 
do not have full information for all countries and years. The sample includes over 3.6 
                                                 
6 Some PCT patents have comments in Patstat such as “See references of WO 0046271A1”. The data for 
those references are accessible through the international application identifier field, and citations in that 
format were included in the study through the use of an algorithm of our own creation. However, due to an 
inconsistency in the Patstat database, some PCT patents do not have international identification numbers 
which meant we were unable to cross reference their data with their cited documents.  
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million observations. The proportion of D-citations in the total is our dependent variable, 
computable for over 7 million citations. 
{Figure 4 around here} 
The evolution of applicant citation shares has been declining in the period of observation, 
1997-2007 (Figure 5), following the pattern detected by Criscuolo & Verspagen (2008: 
Fig. 1) for the period 1985-2000. 
{Figure 5 around here} 
National variation in the sample is clear (Figure 6), with many core European Union 
states showing the highest applicant citation shares. A club effect is already apparent 
since the highest examiner citation shares correspond to countries that do not belong to 
the EPOrg: US, Japan, Korea, China and Australia.7 
{Figure 6 around here} 
In Europe, a pattern favoring the main Western countries emerges (Figure 7): applicant 
citation shares are larger for Belgium, Netherlands, Switzerland, Austria, Germany and 
France while examiner citation shares are larger for peripheral countries such as Spain, 
Poland, Italy and Greece. This suggests large applicant citation shares are related to 
economic wealth. There are exceptions for both sides: East European, lower income 
countries such as Slovenia and Hungary stand out for applicant citation shares and higher 
income countries such as Finland stand out for examiner citation shares. Hence, other 
factors matter, and are accounted for in the econometric estimations. 
{Figure 7 around here} 
Table 2 provides information on the econometric model variables. 
                                                 
7 See full list of member states: http://www.epo.org/about-us/organisation/member-states.html [2/5/2014]. 
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{Table 2 around here} 
The dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the citation comes from the 
examiner. A logit model is appropriate for this kind of data. 
4 Results	
Table 3 presents the estimations. Column 1 includes the specification of Equation (1) 
with citation and patent characteristics only; the remaining columns include the variables 
progressively. 
{Table 3 around here} 
4.1 Citation	and	patent	characteristics	
The results for the sub-national variables are consistent across estimations. We begin 
with EPO procedural aspects, where we expect a strong ‘early intervention’ effect: in 
shorter application procedures and in earlier phases applicants should include more 
citations than examiners. Citations are coded to indicate whether the origin is a Euro-
PCT (not a direct EPO) application, and whether it is the European search report or the 
examiner report (rather than the international search report). The coefficient of “Euro-
PCT” is negative and significant, indicating that this longer procedure leads to higher 
numbers of examiner citations. The coefficient of “European search report” is negative 
and significant, implying that citations in this second phase are more likely to be 
associated with examiners than if there was an international search report in the first 
phase. The coefficient of “Examiner report” is also negative and significant and higher 
than the coefficient of “European search report”, meaning that citations in this third 
phase are most likely to come from examiners. These results are all consistent with the 
explanations in section 2.2, and consequently EPO measures using pooled data will be 
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biased towards finding more citations related to Euro-PCT and international search 
reports than if only applicant citations are used. 
The sample includes applications and grants. If examiner citations imply that the 
application is not well documented and/or not very novel, we would expect lower 
applicant citation shares on applications unlikely to be granted. Patstat includes codes 
that allow identification of whether an application was granted or not. This is controlled 
for in the models by the dummy variable “Grant”. The estimated coefficient is positive 
and significant. Hence, we can confirm a link between receiving relatively fewer 
examiner citations and having the patent granted. In part, this is intuitive. It becomes 
more interesting if we consider that, in the USPTO, this does not necessarily apply. In the 
USPTO, more experienced examiners, and examiners that systematically cite less prior 
art, are more likely to award patent grants (Lemley & Sampat, 2012). Moreover, USPTO 
examiners rarely use applicant citations to reject a grant (Cotropia et al., 2013). Hence, 
examiner citation shares are not associated with denial of a grant in the USPTO but they 
are in the EPO. This and other signs may indicate the superiority of the EPO patent 
system (Saint-George & van Pottelsberghe, 2013). 
Citations can be to patent literature or non-patent literature. The study of knowledge 
flows through patent citations focuses on patent literature (Jaffe et al., 1993) and refers to 
difference between examiners and applicants (Thompson, 2006; Alcácer & Gittelman, 
2006; Criscuolo & Verspagen, 2008). However, citations to non-patent literature are 
interesting because they signal science relatedness (Callaert et al., 2013) and their study 
is mandatory in the context of the EPO because they are more frequent in the EPO than 
in other patent offices (Michel & Bettels, 2001; Callaert et al., 2006). We test whether 
applicants are more likely than examiners to cite non-patent literature, extrapolating from 
US evidence that examiners rarely cite non-patent literature (Sampat, 2004). The positive 
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and significant sign of “Non-patent literature” shows that this is the case. Applicants are 
probably more familiar with the fundamental knowledge base underpinning their 
inventions, while examiners are often engineers whose expertise is related more to 
parcels of applied knowledge. This large-scale sample provides evidence that use of 
pooled citation data most likely underestimates the importance of science relatedness for 
patenting compared to use of only applicant citations. 
4.2 Applicant	characteristics	
The expected effect of type of organization on examiner citation shares is tricky. Firms 
are the main patentees and may be more familiar with the rules of the game, which in 
turn may make their applications less subject to insertion of examiner citations. However, 
universities and government labs are closer to the science base and also are often familiar 
with the relevant literature, which will also reduce examiner added citations. Serial 
academic invention is based on the quality of earlier patents (Lawson and Sterzi, 2013), 
which is another reason to expect lower examiner citation shares. Dummies for 
organizational type of the applicant (models 2-3) can be used to validate empirically what 
matters more. “Company only” is the benchmark. The positive, significant coefficients of 
“Government only” and “University only” indicate that these institutions generate more 
reliability than corporate patents.8 The coefficients of “Individuals only” and “Hospital 
only” are negative and significant, which means that citations are less likely to originate 
in applicants than in the case of firms. Individuals may show lower citation shares 
because institutions facilitate settings where citing is more common practice, i.e. through 
sharing of references and codified knowledge. Examiner citation shares may be larger for 
                                                 
8 The coefficient of “University only” is positive and significant in model 3 but not model 2, suggesting 
that the inclusion of national characteristics is important to estimate precisely the effect of the applicant’s 
organizational type.  
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private hospitals because they do not have a tradition of patenting, and on patents related 
to clinical practice which are less related to science. 
Patents co-applied for by more than one organizational type are evidence of 
technological cooperation between the partners. Among the different possible 
relationships, university and/or government-industry interaction has been shown to have 
potential benefits. Industry historically has been interested in ensuring that higher 
education institutions provide practical solutions to technical needs, even in low-tech 
regions (Ortega-Colomer, 2013). Firms get access to doctoral graduates through 
cooperation with universities (Garcia-Quevedo et al., 2012). For academics, establishing 
appropriate combinations of strong and weak ties with external actors, mainly firms, 
increases research output (Villanueva-Felez et al., 2013). If university and/or 
government-industry interaction are so useful, one would expect to find them linked to 
larger applicant citation shares, because they would originate better documented and 
more novel patent applications. Models 2-3 include dummies for types of organizational 
interactions (taking “Company only” as benchmark). University-company co-
applications for patents are strongly associated with a higher probability of an applicant 
rather than the examiner including a citation. Somewhat surprisingly, government-
company co-application for patents is negatively related to that probability. A possible 
reason might be that organizations in the category government have heterogeneous 
missions. Government labs with an industry orientation are more likely to engage in 
partnerships with firms that lead to patents, than labs with an academic orientation, and 
the government-company dummy captures this type of partnership. This double industry 
orientation receives a higher share of examiner citations. For other interactions 
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(“Company-hospital”, “University-government”) the dependent variable does not change 
significantly.9 
More experienced applicants may have learnt the rules of the game and know better how 
to lower the cost of reference search efforts. Therefore, one would expect a higher 
probability of applicant citations in patents from repeat patentees. The database allows 
for the inclusion of a variable based on total number of applications filed by the same 
applicant. In contrast to our expectations, the number of applicant citations decreases 
with the increase in the number of applications. Alcácer et al. (2009) found the same in 
the USPTO case. Their explanation is that large applicants prefer “broad patent 
portfolios, with relatively low value placed on any single invention” (p. 426). 
Alternatively, it might be that applicants include unrelated cites after the invention or 
omit relevant cites for strategic reasons (Breschi & Lissoni, 2005). Perhaps experienced 
applicants learn how to “cheat”, and hide a higher number of relevant references. Both 
views need further investigation, and could be the subject of future research. However, 
the present evidence shows that the EPO and the USPTO are similar in this regard. 
4.3 National	characteristics	
National characteristics have a variety of effects (model 3). Ideally, applicants use 
citations to claim the novelty of their invention, arguing improvements in the state of the 
art. Examiners use citations for the opposite reason: to claim that novelty is not so high 
given the existence of similar inventions or bodies of knowledge. This implies that patent 
applications where the proportion of applicant citations is high are probably patents that 
the examiner considers quite novel, because he/she does not need to refute many claims. 
Thus, larger, wealthier and scientifically stronger countries are more likely to create 
                                                 
9 We dropped from the sample a few observations with triple institutional interactions because their scarce 
numbers provoked multicollinearity. 
INGENIO (CSIC‐UPV) Working Paper Series 2014‐06 
 15
conditions favorable to the appearance of novelty. The variables GDP, per capita GDP 
and GERD intensity test this assumption. Their positive, significant coefficients provide 
evidence to support it. Hence, we observe that countries with these favorable 
endowments benefit from lower examiner citation shares. This corresponds with other 
evidence showing that these countries are more innovative (Furman et al., 2002). 
The composition of R&D by source of funding has concerned some scholars. High shares 
of business funding of R&D are associated with higher innovative capacity measured by 
patents at the national level (Furman et al., 2002). This is associated with the applied 
orientation of national research and lower knowledge flows (Azagra-Caro & Consoli, 
2014). Applied orientation and lower knowledge flows may be at odds with novelty 
because they imply narrower scope than basic research. Hence, we may expect a lower 
probability of an applicant originating a citation than the examiner, in countries with 
higher shares of business funding of R&D. The coefficient of the share of business 
funding variable in model 3 is negative and significant, supporting this expectation. 
Examiner citation shares are higher in patents from national contexts where the research 
orientation is towards more applied research. 
Country block effects may also play a role in the model. Specifically, we are interested in 
whether there is a club effect similar to the one shown by Alcácer et al. (2009) in the 
USPTO case: US applicants receive fewer examiner citation shares than non-US ones. In 
our EPO sample, this club effect would not be strictly national since the EPO is 
international. Instead, we propose that such an effect might be visible for countries 
belonging to the EPOrg. This may be due to better knowledge of the ‘rules of the game’ 
among signatories to the EPOrg and may translate into larger examiner citation shares for 
non-EPOrg countries. In the model, the dummy is equal to 1 if the applicant country 
belongs to EPOrg, to capture this phenomenon. The estimation (positive and significant) 
INGENIO (CSIC‐UPV) Working Paper Series 2014‐06 
 16
verifies that there is a lower propensity for EPOrg member states to receive cites from the 
examiner. Hence, the EPO is similar to the USPTO: outsiders are less warmly received. 
Having isolated a club effect, it is possible that the nationality of examiners might be 
influential. Collins & Wyatt (1988) detected national chauvinism in citations to non-
patent literature in US genetics patents: “it appears that every country is its own best 
citer” (p.73). However, Meyer (2000) finds no signs of national chauvinism in 
nanotechnology patent applications to the USPTO from Swedish applicants, but finds 
evidence of cosmopolitanism – perhaps due to small country size. If we assume the 
presence of national chauvinism in examiner citation shares, it may show up in lower 
citations to the home countries of examiners. This may be due to a common cultural 
background that includes knowledge of similar references (including in the native 
language), or to deliberate misconduct. The positive, significant coefficient of the 
probability of an application being examined by an examiner from the same country as 
the patent applicant provides support for the national chauvinism assumption. Examiners 
are more likely to favor (in terms of adding fewer citations) patents from applicants of 
the same nationality as themselves. 
5 Towards	an	interpretative	framework	
Previous research has not tackled in depth what the differences between applicant or 
examiner citations might mean. Early works were aimed at disentangling whether related 
indicators changed results about geographical spillovers (Thompson, 2006; Alcácer & 
Gittelman, 2006; Criscuolo & Verspagen, 2008). The studies by Alcácer et al. (2009) and 
Azagra-Caro et al. (2011) made advances by qualifying applicant citation shares as 
indicators of ‘applicant search effort’ and examiner citation shares as indicators of 
‘examiner trust’ on the probability that a patent application is granted. Both works 
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provide intuitive but speculative and arguable reasons for using those labels. The present 
paper does not aim to offer a definitive answer and interviews with key actors would 
result in more accurate information. However, the significant statistical associations 
found may help to support use of the labels ‘applicant search effort’ and ‘examiner trust’. 
It seems that high applicant citation shares are related to the possibility of getting the 
patent being granted which is what one would expect if applicant search efforts were 
rewarded. Being awarded a patent could be considered synonymous with examiner trust. 
Examiner citation shares are lower in the presence of a scientific knowledge base, which 
could be expected if examiners trust that basicness fulfils the legal requirement for 
novelty.10 Examiner citation shares also decrease in applications from richer and more 
R&D intensive countries, which implies that these countries are responsible for more 
valid filings (indicating more applicant search effort) or can rely on positive reputation 
(indicating examiner trust). 
In this framework, we would interpret the results as follows. Examiner trust depends 
positively on the science-relatedness of the knowledge base, and on national economic 
and research strengths. This seems compatible with the theory of well functioning patent 
systems. The desirability of other significant influences is more ambiguous. Examiner 
trust could also be positively related to country-block club effects and national 
chauvinism. These may be understood in terms of common rules of the game and 
common cultural background. However, examiner trust might also indicate that trust is a 
socially mediated construct, and that awarding a patent may be subject to certain 
inefficiencies. To summarize, these interpretations, or analogous ones if we use the label 
‘applicant search effort’ instead of ‘examiner trust’, depend on how much we believe that 
                                                 
10 This holds at different aggregation levels: the citation (non-patent literature), the institution (university, 
government, company-university) and the country (% of non-business funding of R&D). 
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the labels are adequate. This study provides quantitative support to previous conjectures 
in order to stimulate further discussion. 
6 Conclusions	
The literature on the geography of knowledge flows has shown that the probability of an 
applicant rather than the examiner originating a citation depends on differences between 
citing and cited countries (Thompson, 2006; Alcácer & Gittelman, 2006; Criscuolo & 
Verspagen, 2008).11 Our contribution to this stream of literature is that the conditions of 
the citing country also matter to predict that probability. Our findings show that better 
national economic and scientific endowments increase applicant citation shares, whereas 
higher proportions of business funding of R&D foster examiner citation shares. Future 
research could test which group of determinants (citing country characteristics or citing-
cited country differences) matter more. 
Previous analyses of the characteristics of applicant versus examiner citation shares 
found differences across patent and applicant characteristics (Alcácer et al., 2009; 
Azagra-Caro et al., 2011). We show the presence of additional disparities across citation 
characteristics, namely procedural aspects of the patenting process and knowledge base 
of the patent. Our results for procedural aspects increase our understanding of the 
generation of citations in the various phases of the life of an EPO application. Our results 
for knowledge base suggest the importance of science to provide credibility to 
applications. 
                                                 
11 This has led to critiques of the use of pooled backward citations to the extent of disregarding non-patent 
literature to measure university-industry collaboration (Chen et al., 2012), or justifying the use of applicant 
citations only (Acosta et al., 2013). Others have suggested that backward citations, whether added by 
examiners or applicants, are valid as indicators of technological relatedness (Barirani et al., 2013). Survey 
results indicate that reliance on non-patent literature as indicators of scientific flows depends on the type of 
citation, with applicant self-citations being the most reliable (Li et al., 2014). 
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The use of a sample based on EPO applications allowed comparison with earlier works 
exploiting USPTO evidence. It suggests that large applicant citation shares are more 
clearly associated with being awarded a patent by the EPO than the USPTO (Lemley & 
Sampat, 2009; Cotropia et al., 2011). It also signals that there are similar club effects, 
which favor EPOrg members at the EPO and US residents at the USPTO (Alcácer el al., 
2009). Since the methods used by Alcácer et al. (2009) and those applied in this study 
differ, interpretation of this comparison should be cautious. A possible avenue of further 
inquiry could be designing an experiment to enable direct comparison between both data 
sources. 
Another line of investigation could exploit the distinction between applicant and 
examinant citations to search for potential weaknesses in examiner practices (Collins & 
Wyatt, 1998; Meyer, 2000; Lemley & Sampat, 2009; Cotropia et al., 2011). This would 
mostly concern the individual level and our paper does not allow straightforward 
comparison. However, at the aggregate level, the present study offers large-scale 
quantitative evidence of national bias at the EPO. After controlling for differences in 
technology fields, national economic and R&D strength, EPO club effect, etc., we find 
that the nationality of examiners still conditions the proportion of applicant citations. 
This suggests the presence of a systematic bias that cannot be attributed to the other 
factors we control for. This bias may be due to limitations in the cultural knowledge 
bases of EPO examiners or to national chauvinism. Resolution of either would require 
improvements to the selection and/or training of EPO examiners. However, our analysis 
is limited by lack of data on the examiners of individual patent applications; we rely on 
national aggregates and indicators of the probabilities of finding an examiner from the 
same country. Qualitative research could provide additional support for this finding. 
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Overall, as previous research shows, we lack a definitive interpretation of the meaning of 
applicant/examiner citation shares. In the previous section, we supported the idea of 
higher values for applicant citation shares as an indicator of higher examiner trust. If this 
is the case, our results highlight the benefits of fostering the scientific knowledge base, 
public research, university-industry interaction and national economic and scientific 
strengths for promoting trust in technological knowledge production. This conclusion is 
tentative and is suggested to encourage more efforts dedicated to resolving this issue. 
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Figures	
Figure 1 - Phases with either applicant or inventor citations in EPO patents 
 
Figure 2 - Patent count in Patstat ed. October 2012 
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Figure 3 - Backward citations in the 2,022,042 valid patents 
 
 
 
Figure 4 - Observations for the estimations 
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Figure 5 – Steady decline of applicant citation shares 
 
N=3,663,276. Weight: share of number of applicant countries. 
 
Figure 6 - Large national variation in applicant citation shares 
 
N=3,663,276. Only countries with at least 1% of EPO applications. Weight: share of number of applicant countries. 
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Figure 7 - The core-periphery structure of applicant citation shares in Europe 
 
N=3,663,276. Weight: share of number of applicant countries. 
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Tables	
Table 1 - Citation categories in an EPO search report 
Category Meaning (in search reports established for a European 
patent application, or in the European Patent Register) 
Distribution 
(n=3,663,276) 
A Technological background. Used for a document 
representing "state of the art not [regarded as] prejudicial to 
the novelty or inventive step of the claimed invention.” 43.31% 
X Highest possible level of relevance. “Applicable where a 
document is such that when taken alone, a claimed 
invention cannot be considered novel or cannot be 
considered to involve an inventive step." 32.71% 
Y Document particularly relevant if combined with another 
"Y" document. 12.48% 
D Document cited in the application. i.e. cited by the 
applicant itself. 6.54% 
P Intermediate documents, i.e. "[documents] published on 
dates falling between the date of filing of the application 
being examined and the date of priority claimed, or the 
earliest priority if there is more than one. Such a document 
may be relevant if the claimed priority is not valid. 3.23% 
E Potentially conflicting patent documents, i.e. document 
"bearing a filing or priority date earlier than the filing date 
of the application searched ... but published later than that 
date and the content of which would constitute prior art 
relevant to novelty." 1.08% 
T Documents relating to the theory or principle underlying 
the invention. 0.30% 
I This category is not used in search reports but in the 
European Patent Register for a single "X" document 
"particularly relevant for reasons of inventive step". See 
category X. 0.21% 
L Documents cited for other reasons (than the other codes). 
For example, if an examiner "considers that a publication, 
although undated, is highly relevant to the invention and 
can therefore be considered to be of interest to the 
applicant or third parties, he may choose to cite the 
publication in the search report as an "L" document. The 
search report and the written opinion should explain why 
this document was cited." 0.15% 
O Non-written disclosure. 0.01% 
Source: column 2 (meaning), adapted from Guidelines for Examination in the European Patent Office 
September 2013; column 3 (distribution), own elaboration (sum equals 100%). 
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Table 2 - Variable definitions and descriptive statistics (n=3,663,276) 
Vector Name Source Variables Description  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
appcitijklt Applicant citation Patstat Citation category D 1 if citation category is D, 0 if other category 0.07 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Xit Citation 
characteristics 
Patstat Non-patent literature 1 if non-patent literature, 0 if patent literature 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00 
European search report 1 if origin in search report 0.85 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Examination report 1 if origin in examination 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 
Xjt Patent characteristics Patstat Euro-PCT 1 if EPO-PCT, 0 if direct EPO 0.46 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Grant 1 if granted, 0 otherwise 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00 
Filing year Application year 2001.94 3.03 1997.00 2007.00 
 
A Human Necessities 
1 if IPC code is 
A Human Necessities 
0.21 0.41 0.00 1.00 
B Performing Operations; Transporting B Performing Operations; Transporting 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
C Chemistry; Metallurgy C Chemistry; Metallurgy 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00 
D Textiles; Paper D Textiles; Paper 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 
E Fixed Constructions E Fixed Constructions 0.04 0.19 0.00 1.00 
F Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; 
Heating; Weapons; Blasting 
F Mechanical Engineering; Lighting; Heating; 
Weapons; Blasting 
0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00 
G Physics G Physics 0.26 0.44 0.00 1.00 
H Electricity H Electricity 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
Xkt Applicant 
characteristics 
ECOOM*  
Individual 
1 if institutional sector is… 
Individual only 
0.08 0.26 0.00 1.00 
Government Government only 0.03 0.16 0.00 1.00 
University University only 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 
Hospital Hospital only 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Company-government Company and government 0.00 0.04 0.00 1.00 
Company-university Company and university 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Company-hospital Company and hospital 0.00 0.01 0.00 1.00 
Government-university Government and university 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 
# applications Number of applications (millions) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 
Xlt Country of applicant 
characteristics – 
economic and R&D 
OECD R&D 
Statistics 
GDP Real Gross Domestic Product (GDP): billion Euro 0.04 0.04 0.00 0.13 
GDP per capita GDP: Euro per inhabitant (millions) 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.07 
GERD intensity Total intramural Gross R&D expenditure (GERD): 
Millions of Purchasing Power Standards (PPS) at 
2000 prices 
2.51 0.47 0.28 4.58 
% business funding of R&D Business R&D funding: Share of GERD 0.64 0.09 0.17 0.91 
Country of applicant 
characteristics – 
related to EPO 
EPO Annual 
Reports 
Prob EPO exam same country Probability of examiner from same nationality 0.10 0.10 0.00 0.26 
EPOrg member 
EPO member (yes/no) 0.44 0.50 0.00 1.00 
* Methodology for construction of ECOOM data explained in DuPlessis et al. (2009), Magerman et al. (2009) and Peeters et al. (2009). Non-profit organisations are 
subsumed within “Government”. Weight: share of number of applicant countries. 
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Table 3 - Logistic regression of the probability of an applicant originating a citation 
rather than the examiner 
 1 
Citation and patent 
characteristics 
2 
+ Applicant 
characteristics 
3 
+ Country 
characteristics 
Euro-PCT -0.68*** -0.68*** -0.48***   
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
European search report -0.93*** -0.94*** -0.57***   
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Examination report -2.73*** -2.74*** -2.43***   
 (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)    
Grant 0.30*** 0.29*** 0.29***   
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)    
Non-patent literature 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.10***   
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)    
Individual  -0.15*** -0.21***   
  (0.01) (0.01)    
University  0.04*** 0.08***   
  (0.01) (0.01)    
Government  0.13*** 0.05***   
  (0.01) (0.01)    
Hospital  -0.39*** -0.31***   
  (0.07) (0.07)    
Company-government  -0.09* -0.10*    
  (0.05) (0.05)    
Company-university  1.16*** 1.14***   
  (0.29) (0.30)    
Company-hospital  0.48* 0.31     
  (0.27) (0.27)    
Government-university  -0.17 -0.40    
  (0.52) (0.53)    
# applications  -0.91 -10.64***  
  (0.56) (0.57)    
GDP   0.84***   
   (0.14)    
Per capita GDP   18.77***   
   (0.86)    
GERD intensity   0.27***   
   (0.01)    
% business funding of R&D   -0.88***   
   (0.04)    
Prob EPO exam same country   0.61***   
   (0.04)    
EPOrg member   0.64***   
   (0.01)    
Constant 37.53*** 38.74*** 67.19***   
 (1.44) (1.45) (1.64)    
Observations 3,663,276 3,663,276 3,663,276  
Log likelihood -848,023 -847,774 -838,745   
χ2 54,181 54,658 75,414    
Prob>χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000    
* p<0.1; ** p<0.05; *** p<0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthesis. No collinearity according to 
Variance Inflation Factors. All models include a trend and eight IPC section dummies. Weight: share of 
number of applicant countries. 
